Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1957

Lloyd F. Webster and Carl A. Webster v. John J.
Knop et al : Brief of Respondents
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Adams, Peterson & Anderson; Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Respondents;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Webster v. Knop, No. 8577 (Utah Supreme Court, 1957).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2691

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

Case No. 8577 ·

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

:tLOYD

P~

WEBSTER and CARL

.~A.<WEBSTER,
__ '

·

,..

··!·\'",

•

"Plaintiffs· and Respondents,
.~.

-vs.---.
J.OHN J. KNOP, ·WYCOTAH OIL
CO~, a Corporation,
DOUGLAS J. DAVIS, GRANT
SJ(UMWAY, JOHN DOE, RICHARD .ROE, .FIRST ROE,
Defendants and Appellants.

'& ·. URANIUM

r

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

ADAMS, PETERSON ~ ANDERSON
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Respondents
.Monticello, Utah

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

STATEMENT OF FACTS ------------------------------------------------------------

1

ANSWER TO APPELLANTS' POINTS ----------------------------------

3

ARGUMENT -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------1. Answer to Appellants' Points No. 1 and No. 2____________

3
3

2.

Answer to Appellants' Points No. 3 and No. 4 ____________ 19

CONCLUSION -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 21

AUTHORITIES ·CITED
Ballard v. Golob, Colorado, 83 P.ac. 376·--------------------------------------- 4
Bradley v. Andrews, 91 Colorado 378, 14 P. 2d 1086 ________________ 17
Cadle v. Helfrich, 36 Ariz. 390, 286 Pac. 186____________________________

4

Clark v. Mitchell, Nevada, 130 Pac. 760 .. ---------------------------------- 5
Craw v. Wilson, 22 Nev. 385, 40 Pac. 1076 ________________________________ 17
Hendrickson v. California Talc Company, California, 130
p 2d 807 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------8,20
Hodgson v. Federal Oil & Development ·Co., 27 4 U.S. 15________ 18
Hollingisworth v. Tufts, Colorado, 162 Pac. 155________________________ 17
Hunt v. Patchin, 35 Fed. 816----------------------------------------------------------

4

Jennings v. Rickard, Colorado, 15 Pac. 677 .... ---------------------------- 17
\

King v. Hintze, 2 Utah 2d 166, 270 P 2d 1095---------------------------- 14
Kline v. Wright, 42 F. 2d 927·--------------·---------------------------------------- 4
Knight v. Flat Top Mining Co., Utah No. 8439 ________________________ 21
Morrow v. Coast Land Co., 29 Cal. App. 2d 92, 84 P. 2d 30L .. 17
Page v. Summers, 70 Cal. 121, 12 Pac. 120____________________________ 17
Soule v. Johnson, Idaho, 201 Pac. 834____________________________________________

4

Speed v. McCarthy, South Dakota, 77 N.W. 590 (affirmed,
181 U.S. 269) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6
Stephens v. Golob, Colorado, 83 Pac. 381. ___________________________________ 20
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
(0 ontinued)
Page
Stevens v. Grand Central Mining Co., 133 Fed. 28 ________________ 3,4,21
Turner v. Sawyer, 150 U.S. 578 ______________________________________________________ 3,4
Yarwood v. Johnson, Washington, 70 Pac. 123 ________________________ 4
TEXTS CITED
40 Corpus Juris, Mines, Pages 1154, 1155 ____________________________________ 19
3 Lindley on Mines (3rd Ed.) 858.----------------------------------------------- 19
5 Utah Law Review, Page 35 .... ---------------------------------------------------- 15

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
LLOYD P. \VEBSTER and CARL
A. WEBST.ER,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
-vs.J"OI-IN J. KNOP, WYCOTAH OIL

Case No. 8577

& URANIUM CO., a Corporation,

DOUGLAS J. DAVIS, GRANT
SHUMWAY, JOHN DOE, RICHARD ROE, FIRST ROE,
Defendants and Appellants.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

RESPONDENTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondents in this case are Lloyd P. Webster
and Carl A. Webster, who will be referred to as Plaintiffs and Respondents; and Appellants Douglas J. Davis
and Grant Shumway will be referred to as Appellants.
Other parties to the action who are no longer before this
Court will be referred to by name.
Respondents do not controvert appellants' statement
of facts as being inconsistent but contend that their
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statement is incomplete and that the following facts also
appear from the reeord:
That the location of the Faith Cl_a_i_gl~ ~n._~p~ 15,
( 1954, in the name of plaintiffs a~ the defendant, .John
, J. KnoJ?_, menti<:>:~ted on Page 5 of appellants' brief, was
~ade by the__Qlaintiffs pursuant to the Grubstake Agree!!l~P.!d~-~l_for'ih__ in full on Pages 3 to 5 of appellantS:
brief._(Pre-trial Order of the Trial Court, R. 45)
1

That the copies of the K otices of Location recorded
on April 24, 1954, and the copies of the amended Notices
of Location recorded on _.._-1._ugust 12, 1954, referred to on
Page 5 of appellants' brief, named the plaintiffs and
the defendant Knop as the locator.s of the Faith claims.
(Abstract of title, plaintiffs' Exhibit 2)
That the appellant, Grant Shumway testified that on
examination of the records pertaining to the Faith claims
in the Recorder·s Office of San Juan County, State of
Ptah, _]w and the appellant, Douglas J. Davis, _found the
~G~rd~cl copies of the Xotices of_Lo~till!!_!eCQ_r_<:!~d on
April :2-l-, 195±, and the Aluended X otices of Location re:
, corded on . August 13, 1954, whiclLnam~e ~i!l~
/
\

a~~ the_ defe~)dant J~n()p_~s the locators ?f the Faith
d.u!ns~_ (Tr. 1 ... )

That appellant Douglas J. Davis testified that when
ht' Pxamined the records of the Hecorder's Office of San
,Jnan County, t Ttah, in nfonticello, rtah, he discovered
ti1P eo piP~ of the Not iees of Location recorded April 2±,
t 9;)-l-, and the _.\lnended Notices of Location recorded
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August 12, 1954, which named the plaintiffs and the
defendant Knop as the locators of the Faith claims. (Tr.
33)

rrhat prior to the execution of the quit claim deed
of the Faith claims from defendant Knop to the appellants Douglas J. Davis and Grant Shumway, on July
26, 1955, as shown on Page 6 of appellants' brief, the
appellants Douglas J. Davis and Grant Shumway m_a_de_ \
no effort to contact the plaintiffs to inquire as to whether_ '
they claim~d a~y interest in the Faith claims. ( Tr. 24, _/
25, 52)
That the Notices of Location recorded by the defendant Knop on August 27, 1954, used exactly the same
description and covered exactly the same ground .as the
Amended Notices of Location recorded on August 10,
1954. (Abstract of title, plaintiffs' Exhibit 2)
ARGU:WIENT
IN ANSWER TO APPELLANTS' POINTS NOS. 1 AND
2, THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT
THE DEFENDANT, JOHN J. KNOP, HELD THE TITLE TO
THE FAITH ·CLAIMS ACQUIRED BY THE LOCATION OF
AUGUST 14, 1954, IN TRUST FOR THE PLAINTIFFS TO
THE EXTENT OF AN UNDIVIDED TWO-THIRDS INTEREST.

It 1s well established that a co-owner of an unpatented mining claim who secures a patent to the exclusion of his co-owner, holds the title acquired thereby
in trust for his co-owner. Turner v. S.awyer, 150 U.S.
578; Stevens v. Grand Central ~!fining Co., 133 F,ed. 28.
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The cases unanimously hold that a co-owner or cotenant in an unpatented mining claim, who relocates the
claim in his own name alone after the lapse of the .annual
assessment work, holds the title acquired by reason of the
relocation in trust for his co-tenant. Hunt v. Patchin,
35 Fed. 816; !{line v. Wright, 42 F. 2d 927; Yarwood
v. Johnson, \Y ashington, 70 Pac. 123; Ballard v. Golob,
Colorado, 83 Pac. 376; Soule v. Johnson, Idaho, 201 Pac.
~:3-±: Cadle v. Helfrich, 36 Ariz. 390, 286 P.ac. 186.
These cases are merely specific applications of the
general rule that "co-tenants stand in a certain relation
to each other of 1nutual trust and confidence; that neither
will be permitted to act in hostility to the other in reference to the joint estate; and that the distinct title aequired by one will inure to the benefit of all ..." (Turner v. Sawyer, supra) and further that "a co-owner who
an1ends the location notice, relocates the claim, or procures the issuance of a patent in his own name, will not
be pennitted to thus exclude the other owners and appropriate the clainl to hinlself. but wnl be declared to hold
the right or title thereby acquired in trust for all."
(Stevens Y. Grand Central :J[ining Co., supra.) (Italics
added)
In the ease at hand the eYidence shows a location
h~· the plaintiffs and the defendant J olm J. l{nop and a
snhst>qlwnt relocation in his own nrune by the said Knop.
ThP Appellants argue that the general rule above stated
should not hP applied to this ease because it is distinguishable frmu the eases allOYl~ cited, on the ground that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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in this case the original locations by the plaintiffs and the
defendant John J. I\::nop, pursuant to the Grub Stake
Agreement, were invalid at the outset. Respondents concede that the locations of April 15, 1954, were ~oj_d_ ~s _
between the locators and the government al_!_g_illso. _alLt9
iliirdpaf11es-acqulringrighls--in--~d.:_~espo~~~~!~ __ _
UeiiyfllaT111eTocatwns we_~__vo~~}or_~'qJlRJf'!.PQ.s_es'' and
contend thaTas-bet\\~een the parties to the location, a
fiduciary relationship of co-tenancy came into existence.
The principle that the relationship of co-tenancy, in ((
equity, between co-locators, arises upon the location of I i
an unpatented mining clairn, even though invalid as :
against third parties .and the government, is clearly illus-,
trated in the following cases :
ln Clark v. lv!itchell, Nevada, 130 Pac. 760, the defendant agreed with the owners to do the as.sess1nent
work on the Siver King Fraction claim for a one-fourth
interest in that clairn. The defendant failed to do the
assessment work agreed upon and relocated Whirlwind
No. 4 claim in his own nan1e over the ground covered by
the Silver King Fraction. The owners of the latter
claim brought a suit to impose a trust in their favor for
a three-quarters interest in the vVhirlwind No. 4 claim.
The defendant contended that the Silver King Fraction

was not valid because it was .separated into two parcels
by a prior valid claim and consequently there was no
I[

trust relationship because the claim was invalid in its

,c

inception. The court, in rejecting the defendant's contention and imposing the trust, said:
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"As under the agreement, Mitchell (defendant) was a trusted agent or representative of
Clark (plaintiff), for the doing of the work on
the .Silv:er ~ing Fraction and for relocating the
WhirlWind No. 4 and ~Iitchell was in duty bound
to protect Clark to the extent of the interests
agreed upon in the Silver King Fraction and in
the relocatio_n of the Whirlwind No. 4, Mitchell
as a tenant 'ln common, was estopped from denyJ ing the rights of Clark in the claim, as recognized
by their agreement. V\7fiether the relocation made
by Mitchell contains more or less ground, and
whether the Silver King Fraction may hold a
piece of land segregated from its location point,
are not questions properly in issue in these cases.
These parties being.. in e(_luit~ants in common.Jwhatever rights .1.l!itchell acquired by location or
by possession, or otherwise, in the ground, u·ould
inure to the benefit of Clark to the extent of the
undivided interest to zclz iclz he is entitled. Whether
one or more of the locations are valid or subsequent to others is not material. The undirided
interest of Clark and J.l!itclzell stand on a common
basis, difierently than if a stranger were seeking
to recoL:er the land ou the claim that their location
was roid a11d tlzat he lzad made the first ralid
one." (Italics added)
In SJJccd r. JJcCarfh,ll. South Dakota, 77 N."\Y. 590
( affinned, 1~1 l r.s. ~tl9). tl1e plaintiff purchased an intPre~t of one of the locators of the 1nining clain1s located
h~, the defendants. The defendants reloe.ated tne claim
aftPr no annual assessment work was done. Defendants
~ought to defend .an aetion hy the plaintiff to ilnpose a
trust on the grounds that the original elailns were invalid lH'('an~c thPrP was no dis('OYery and consequently
~···-
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p~t.!

there was no cotenancy and no fiduciary duty ~ecause
;;-right~ c~~e i~1to exi~te~ce as .a result-;£ the location.
The court rejected this contention, l!Qldtng that it con- f/{7/?,.
sidered the clain1s valid as between the parties to the lo~ ~
cation and defendants would not be permitted to deny
/4:
---------------------------........___----that their locations were valid. Based upon this .assump----------------------- ---tion, the court applied the general rule, using the following language :
·--.

-

-------"

"The relocator is permitted by the statute
(requiring annual assessn1ent work) to acquire
the property in the s.ame manner that the original
locator would have acquired it, but because of his
relation to another who may be a co-tenant, a
p1ortgag~e, or person having no ~~state ~in the ~
~erty~ wilU>_e__adj@g_ed_Jo_hold ±he title in_
~~t !or such person. J~l cases of th,is cltar-\
acle_r thf;_Jrust depends upon the relatio'J'l, of the )
parties at?Jd not upon the 'manner in which title
__!!~acquired.'' (Italics added).
Appellants seek to avoid the imposition of the rule
applied in these latter two cases by drawing an even
finer distinclion, that is, "'that. the~ inyalis].ity _of tbe rru:rported
original location
is - not --based upon minor
te~hnical
~-"---"
"'--- ~
----defeG_t, e.g., improper monuments or l~
but is based ~ohce-ded-inability to place any min-~ ~
i_ng chtill1 whatsomz:.er. upo-n-the- prope_r~tl:." It is worthy
of note that Appellants assert no basis, which bears a
relation to the reasons announced in the cases for applying the trust rule, for n1aking the distinctions sought
to be made, that is, between cases where the claim becomes invalid because of failure to perform the annual
\..._-.----

--------·

'-----

-

....

.

.

.
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assessment work; cases where the claim is invalid from
the beginning because of lack of discovery or because the
claim is divided by a prior valid claim; and the present
case where the claims are invalid because the land on
which they were located was withdrawn by a pre-existing
oil and gas lease. The trust arises out of th rel tionshi
of the parties and does not
end on the technical es
f£?--~~!:_J?.ing the validity of unpatented mining claims as
~~~and third parties or the government.

H endrick.'jon r. California Talc Co'mpany, California,
130 P. 2d 806, presents a situation in which the mining
claims "\vere originally located on withdrawn land and
effectively answers .Appellants~ contention that the distinctions above mentioned should be made. The facts of
that ease are stated as follows by the court:
"On June 7, 1930, appellant. ~-\man and respondent, Osear L. Hoerner, Scott and Farnum
were on the ~IojaYe Desert on business connected
with another clain1 whieh is not here involved.
Noticing the white hill to the northwest. they
went over. discovered a deposit of bentonite clay
and located a c.lain1 Co-operation Xo. 1. Desiring
to take in 1~0 aeres. theY included as eo-locators
the nrunes of appellant, Hendrieksen and respond('nt, Hateliffe. They deseribed and n1arked on the
ground a parcel of land smne 8,500 feet long and
600 feet "·ide ru1d erected a diseoYerY 1nonmnent
and boundary ntonuments. * * * X~ contention
i:.; 1nade that· all requirements for 1naking such a
loea.tion w0r0 not nwt .and ohseiTed. On the same
da,·, thPY infonned IIendrieksen that he had been
iiH:lndP(l as one of the locators of this claiin and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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'·&r·
e
.

shortly thereafter Ratcliffe
was informed of his
9
inclusion. * * *
"It appears, however, that the land covered
ft f.'.
by the Co-o~ration No. 1 claim was included inJ!_Z ljr;J./.P"
larg_g_ tract o!._ la_nd whiCh was temporanly with- · ~
drawn from public entry_p~pdi_~g the fixi~g QJJ!
definite location of the line of an aqueduct to _p~ ~. .
oonstnwt.cillD_x_ihe purpose of bq~water_s_. ~
from Boulder Dam into this state_, wb.ich_ with.~
drawal order had ~de on June-4, ~~3g,_t~ree #. p.w
days before that clann was located. Tliis rand was
-rrot·-resforect to pulJhc entry until August 6, 1931.
The fact that this land had been withdrawn from
entry was unknown to any of these parties on
June 7, 1930, ,and was unknown to the appellants
until after the land was located by certain of the
respondents. That fact was learned by Oscar L.
Hoerner and by Scott, Ratcliffe and Farnum
shortly after the attempted location of Co-operation No. 1 claim, ~(i4~~~I>-~rties il!_f_Q_rl_!_led their associates Hendricks_e_n__or Aman_ of this
fact. *** Tf11-I>ec~~b~~ 15, 1931, and aftei- the
laii.d had been restored to entry, the respondent,
Oscar L. Hoerner located Company claims No. 1,
No. 2, No. 3 and No. 4, respectively, including as
co-locators, his wife, his brother, and five of the
other respon~_ents. A few days later, the other
five conveyed their interest to the Hoerners and
still later the IIoerners entered into an agreement
with the California Talc Company which was
thereafter assigned to the National Lead Company. -11?-e court found that each of these corpor_:0
ate res ondents entered into these a reements
ith notice that the appellants each clairne an
undivided one-sixth Interest ui and to that p.art
of the land whiCh had been Inclu<;Ied Ill tbe (~a:
operation No. 1 claim. ***"
The court sajd, after reciting the above facts:

t•YJ
n. O,.b
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"T~e controlling question is, whether, under
these cncum.stances, the respondent, Oscar L.
~oerner had the right to relocate this land for
his own benefit, after it was restored to entry and
whether he thereby secured a valid location as to
that part of the land included in the former Coop~ration No. 1 claim free from any equitable
claims on the part of the appellants. The gist of
the respo!li!~!!ts'_ contention_ is that tile ongmal
f0Ca~!9n _]~~il!g void, any of the- origrnal locators
had ~- legal right, after the lands were restored
to _ep.!ry, t<? un1fe ~!h~otQ.er _l_o~atQrs-in ig~fug_
llie _!lew~ and v~l!Q location free from any duty or
responsibilitY to other appellants, who were their
~~-~oCTates-m:--tne-orfgill.aTatfemptealoe::J.gQil. ***

"There is no question that the attempted location of this claim on June 7, 1930, \Yas void as
between the locators and the government and
that the same would be void as to third parties
who acquired rights in the land. *'u'
"'The situation here presented is one where
the_gQyeiillllen t is~plaining, _where no third
party is involved, W:.ll~~- of the~
·---r-ors d.iscoyered t'Ih'lt the n1ethoo-by whic1i 11iey
were proceeaing was defectiYe --because--me-Ta.Iid
haa Been retnporaril~- "ithdra'm fr~d
\\·hirh faet \,-as unlmowh to the others, and where
this lHlrt~- without informing the others concerning the situation atteinpted to relocate or, as lie
~ay8 ~to loeate' the clailn for his own benefit_
respeet to the inYalidity of mining
I ela im8"'Vith
and the right8 of co-locators, the courts
hnn' long- recognized that .a different situation
may prevail as between the co-locators then1selYes
and that whieh g·oyern as between the locator and
the govennnent or a third party.
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"In Speed v. :McCarthy, 181 U.S. 269, 21 S. Ct.
613, 616, 45 L. Ed. 855, the court said:
'The court held that the relation of cotenant existed between lHcCarthy and Franklin when Franklin located the Holy Terror
and l{eystone claims; that original locators
may resume work at any time before relocation; that Franklin's acts of relocation did
not terminate the fiduciary relocation between himself and :McCarthy; and said : "We
think the circuit court should have adjudged
the defendants to be trustees, and have enforced the trust." This conclusion is not precluded by the language of the Federal statutes. They provide that upon failure to comply with required conditions as to labor or
improvements the claim or mine upon which
such failure occurred shall be open to location in the same manner as if no location of
the s.ame had ever been made. Rev. Stat. US
2324 (30 USCA (28) ). It is contended that
if Congres.s intended to have the relocator
regarded as a trustee, such intention would
have been expressed in the statute. The contention is not tenable. The trust results from
the fiduciary relation of the parties and not
from the operation of the statute.'
wl1he respondents .argue that the trustee principle there applied has no application here since
in that case the original entry was valid while
here it was invalid. No cases are cited where such
a distinction is drawn .and since the trust arises .
E~ t~e__ r~l~~ion of the partie~, it s.hould no
more Ee defeate<:t-by~-a temporary withdrawal
oruerflian by a failure to eompl;,' with the statute
originaiTf -giv1nga-righf of entry~ In fad, the-former-situation results from ignorance and jnadSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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vertance, while the latter involves a more positive
disregard of the law. No good reason appears
for drawing such a distinction or applying a different rule in such a case as this. If such a rule
applies to a subsequent failure to comply with the
law where the original location was valid the
reasons f or the rule would seem to apply 'with •
even greater force where the locators have associated themselves together for the particular purpose of obtaining title to a particular claim, where
they have complied with all of the requirements
of the law in that regard, where their efforts are
ineffective for the tin1e being because of the temporary withdrawal of the land from the entry,
and where one of the associates discovers the
~neentry antl "ithout infOr:h::iiilg The
others J2!0ceeds_ tg locate ~the Jand for I1imself'
-when-_ the right__QLe__!lt~ _i~_l"e§tored. The usual
!
rules_ that .a Jic1u_cg.,rv relationship exists between
tenants in common and that one co-tenant_ma_Y--llOt
gain a--:P_re~~rifad,anJ~ii ~--_acting_ady_erseiy..to
Ii!s fellow tenants should be .applied _tg___such a.
j case. If it may be said_ that~ -stricti}-_ ~aking1
!.t j these parties were not co-tenants since a complete_

I

II ~;\~~ \1!u1~~~~~,~~: a~:Ir!d~ r~·~'a~t~~i::~~j~t

the court said in Speed~,. :JicCarthy. supra,~
trust results fr01n the fiduciarv rela~
"'pa 1:f10sarufnor-:fi=Oili'-~~t t~
t0elm ieal1Y lw said tol)eCO-tenants. • ••
.

---------

-

-

--

'' 'r0 find nothing in the cases relied upon by
the respondents which support their contention
that the fart that this land had been withdra,Jv"ll
frmn f'nh·~· is controlling and all equitable rules
and principles an~ inapplicable heeanse the atten1pted location was void in ]a"· and in fact.
There is no distinction in this regard between a
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
mining enterprise and other enterprises for which
men associate themselves with an expres.s or implied .agreement to work together for their common good and to a desired end. Equitable rules
have frequently been applied in controversies over
mining claims. Speed v. 11cCarthy, supra, is an
example of such cases.
"The general rule is that parties engaged in
a c.omnwn enterprise owe a duty to e~ach other
with respect to all n1atters in connection therewith, that a trust relationship is inherent in such
an association for a cmnmon purpose, and that
one of the parties will not be allowed to deal with
the subject Inatter of the association for his own
advantage. In 1funson v. Fishburn, 183 Cal. 206,
19 P 808, 810, the court said, 'It is well settled that
the associates in a common enterprise, under
whatever guise, have a duty to each other to make
full disclosure of any preference or profit not
common to all of the associates.' These_gen_eral
..._principles are applicab_le here~I!_Q_ tb.~ __argument.
that the Hoerner location in December, 1931, w~s
not a 'reloca tion'.slnce-·tliereluia Iieen no )~g_al lQ:_
· cation theretofore,-tnaf-the parties were not co.:
tenants aprlJhat some. ()f the elements of a par:tners111l:!_as be.tween these parties were lacking, are \
l
be~ide the point_
"These parties entered into a joint enterprise, having for its object the obtaining of title
to this particular land as a mining claim and the
resulting fiduciary relationship between the parties could not thus lightly be ignored. *** The fact
that the original attempted location was invalid,
the land not being open to entry, is not the conclusive or determining factor. When the withdrawal order was vacated, and the land was restored to entry, no third party acquired any rights
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and the original locators, having otherwise complied with the law, were free to make a valid location. Having found out the facts which were
unknown to the appellants, Hoerner made such
location without including the appellants as parties thereto, b t in so doin h w
r t
act for himself a one Since he occ111ied__a~
ciary: po~on,. the equitable rules apply a~d his_____
act-In relocating the land under such mrcum- _
~ces iiiustye-llelato--rn:ure-to tlieoener1t of the
appellarlfS, for whom he was a trustee.."
The court then ordered that judgment be entered
in favor of the appellant with respect to a one-sixth interest in the part of the land which was found to be within
the limits of the original claim as atten1pted to be located
on June 7, 1930, as against the reloc.ators and their transferees with notice.
Clearly, all the elen1ents which established the trust
in the above case are present in the case at bar. In both
cases we find a ~tion by plaintif~~~nd defendants of__a
mining claim on_lan_d_withd.r~'vn fr_QI!l entry .an___d__a__subs~.J
quent location by the defendants~_to__fu__e__ exclusion_Qf the
pl~i~tiffs, after the in1pedi1nent_t?}o~~ion_ wa~_!'_emQ!~~~
In J(iuq v. Hi11tze, 2 Ftah 2d 166, 270 P 2d 1095, the
plaintiff made n1ining locations in Nevada which were
not valid because of the failure to sink the required
discovery shaft in accordance with N eYada law. Plaintiff
contracted to convey his interest in the property to the
defendant who agreed to form a company and give stock
to the plaintiff. When the defendant visited the claiins
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and recognized that they were invalid, he relocated them
in his own name. Defendant then failed to perform his
obligation under the agree1nent. Plaintiff brought an action to recover on the contract. As a defense, defendant
.asserted that "'the inability of respondent (plaintiff) ***
to convey to appellant sorne .substantial right or interest
in and ·to said unpatented claims constituted a breach of
the promotion contract of such nature as to defeat its
purpose and relieve .and discharge the defendant from
the duty of organizing the corporation contemplated by
the promotion agreeinent.'' The Court affirmed judgment for the plaintiff, and held that the defendant in re.....e-.: :/.,
locating the clairns in his own name, waived ,any defect e-~
in the prior filing. _vVhile the_ Court did not expressly
base its decision,..-~n the trust theory, it- is evident that it
defermjpJ~d that .the_ relationship of pl:Mntifi_a,_n~ _clefegg~
ant was such that the relocation by the defendant inured
totliebenefit -ofphiintiff. (See Vol.-~ Utah Law Review, ~

-

-page-35-f~-

- - -- --. ·-· --- ---

It is obvious from the foregoing, that, contrary to
the statement found on Pages 18 and 19 of Appellants'
Brief, this is .a case "where co-tenants of real property
enter into a relationship of trust, one to the other, so
as to preclude one co-tenant from gaining some advantage with respect to the joint property over his cotenant," and " where joint tenants are acting in hostility
to the joint estate;" .and "where one of several joint
owners of mining claims has sought to ... relocate the

c!aims for his own benefit.>' (Italics added.)
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Appellants contend that inasmuch as the Grubstake
Agreement expired by its own terms prior to the relocation by the defendant Knop on August 14, 1954,
Knop was free to relocate the Faith claims in his own
nmne to the exclusion of plaintiffs. The cases we have
cited hold that the trust relationship arises out of the
originalloc~tiQn of the_claims~_:rl_ihQJJKh -~l!Q~_e_q_11ently
-ro-und to-b~ invalid, .and this relati~!:l_s_}J.ip is notrlependant u~_!l--~!lY agreemen.fto-;-elocate the claims if and
whe!_l_it_b_e~Q.:m_e_~ll-Q~sible to validate them. Thei'_e_ is no
evidence __~hat the trust _!~l~ti~~~~~:EJ?~-~'Yeen th~ _pa_rtigs
_!!_l__thif?_ ~l:!cs_g__ }'~as_ ~yer ~rmin-Jtt~d. In fact, the contraryappears from the fact that Amended Notices of Location,
giving the survey description [the claims were surveyed
during July, 1954, (Defendants' Exhibit 2)] and naming
the plaintiffs and the defendant Knop .as the locators,
were posted on Faith No. 2 to X o. 10, inclusive, on
August 10, 1954, and copies of said notices were recorded on August 12, 1954, all after the expiration date
of the Grubstake . A. green1ent and the latter date only
two days prior to the relocation by Knop in his own
name on August 14, 1954. (Pre-Trial Order of Trial
Court R. 45; Abstract of Title, plaintiffs' Exhibit 2).
Furthermore, the Grubstake Agreen1ent ren1ains in effect for purposes of detern1ining the rights and interests
of the parties as to all clailns located pursuant to its
terms. The Agree1nent conten1plated the situation which
occurred in this case, that is, that the clailns located
thereunder Inight be subject to a pre-existing lease isSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ll•,,.

sued under the l\Iineral Leasing Act of 1920 which would
necessitate validation of the claims at a later date, for
it provides as follows:
"3. It is furthennore specifically understood and agreed that the First Party shall advance all of the costs of filing the aforesaid
claims whether filing as mineral claims or lease
tracts under the Atomic Energy Commission Regulation Circular 7."
At the time the defendant Knop validated the Faith
claims, Public Law 585 of the 83rd Congress superseded
Circular 7 as the means by which such claims were
validated.
Appellants cite cases from courts in this country
in which the parties to the prospecting agreement mutually abandoned the agreement and the claims located
thereunder, (:Morrow v. Coast Land Co., 29 Cal. App
2d 92, 84 P. 2d 301; Page v. Su1nmers, 70 Cal. 121, 12 Pac.
120), cases in which there was no location of the mining
rlaims in question during the term of the agreement
(Jennings v. Rickard, Colorado, 15 Pac. 677), cases in
which the plaintiff contributed nothing to the discovery
of the mining claims or the same were not acquired
with partnership capital (Hollingsworth v. Tufts, Colorado~ 162 Pac. 155; Craw v. \Vilson, 22 Nev. 385, 40 Pac.
1076), cases which do not involve the location of unpatented mining claims at all (Bradley v. Andrews, 91
Colo. 378, 1-± P 2d 1086), and cases in which the right
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of the plaintiff had been extinguished by adverse possession. (Hodgson v. Federal Oil & Development Co.,
274 u.s. 15).
There is no contention nor evidence in the present
case that the plaintiffs abandoned or lost their rights
through adverse possession. The Faith claims were discovered and located during the term of the Grubstake
Agreernent, through the skill and effort of the plaintiffs.
The relocations by the defendant Knop on August 1-1,
1954, used the same discovery and corner monuments
and contained the identical names and descriptions
found in the Amended Notices of Location recorded on
July 5, 1954 (Tr. 4, 5; Abstract of Title, plaintiffs'
Exhibit 2). All Knop did in relocating the claii11s was
to place a new location notice thereon and record a copy
of the same. The contention that the plaintiffs contributed nothing to the location of the Faith clain1s and
that there was no consideration to support the Grubstake Agreement is sufficiently answered by the following quotation from the JHe1norandmn Decision written
by the I-Ionorable F. \Y. l{eller, Trial Judge in this case,
towit:
"Under the location of the Faith Group as
made by the plaintiffs, the parties could not
assert and perfect title through patent proceedings or even a Yalid possessory right, nor could
they assert a Yalid possessory right against other
claimants locating the area after it becmne open
to loe.ation. It cannot on that account he Inaintained that the defendant K nop got nothing for
the considerations advanced by him in his conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tract with the plaintiffs in the location of the
Faith Group. Knop, in making the location after
the area of the Faith Group w.as open to location
had made use of the knowledge obtained by him
through the efforts of the plaintiffs and their
skill as miners in choosing and staking the area
for the first location; he made use of the monuments erected by the plaintiffs for the first
location to make the point of discovery and the
exterior boundaries. There is justice in a rule
which prevents his excluding the plaintiffs from
an interest in the claims. The plaintiffs and the
defendai!_t Knop stood in a relatio1!§_4i!>_of mutual
trust and confidence, .and the title acquired lJy
_Kitop- in:ured-fo- -tli_e __benerit of hfmself and the
plaintiffs." (lVIemor-andum Decision, R. 46.)
Thus it is apparent that the citations found in Appellants' Brief from 3 Lindley on Mines (3rd Ed.) § 858
and 40 Corpus ,Juris, J\Enes, Pages 1154 and 1155 and
the cases frmn foreign jurisdiction cited in the footnotes;
are not in point because the Faith claims were acquired
pursuant to the Grubstake Agreement by the plaintiffs
(Pre-Trial Order of the Trial Cour~t, R. 45).
IN ANSWER TO APPELLANTS' POINTS NOS. 3 AND
4, APPELLANTS WERE NOT BON A FIDE PURCHASERS
FOR VALUE WITHOUT NOTICE AND THEY TqOK 'THE
FAITH CLAIMS SUBJECT TO THE RIGHTS OF RESPONDENTS.

rrhe testimony of the Appellants shows that prior
to the purchase of the Faith claims from the defendant
Knop, the Appellants had actual notice of the following
facts:
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1. That plaintiffs and the defendant Knop located
the Faith claiins on .1\pril15, 1954, pursuant to the Grubstake Agreement and amended the location of the same
on July 5, 1954, and on August 10, 1954. ( Tr. 20, 21, 45,
46; Appellants' Brief pp 8-9).

2. The pre-existing relationship of the plaintiffs
and the defendant Knop. (Appellants' Brief, pp 9-10).
The Appellants made no effort to contact the plaintiffs to inquire of their claim to the property in question
because they were .advised and had concluded that the
plaintiffs had no interest because the location made in
their name and that of the defendant Knop was void.
(Tr. 24, 25, 52).
Thus Appellants knew every fact out of which the
trust relationship in favor of the plaintiffs arose. They
read the original Notices of Location recorded April 24,
1954, which state that the plaintiffs along with the defendant Knop, as locators, claimed the ground covered
by the locations. err. 21, 22, 52). \Yhile they Inay have
been misled as to the legal conclusion to be drawn from
the facts which they knew, it is clear that they are not
bona fide purchasers for value without notice and they
took the Faith clailns subject to plaintiffs' interest.
I-Iendrickson Y. California Talc Co .• supra; Stephens v.
Colorado, 83 Pac. 381; Soule v. Johnson, supra. It follows
frorn the foregojng that the cases cited by Appellants in
their brief reg·arding .a purchaser without notice are not
in point.
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That Appellants knew that the vVebsters (plaintiffs)
claimed an interest in the claims is .attested by the fact
that they went to great lengths to assure themselves
that such interest could not be established legally. (Tr.
24-27, 29, 35-40, 43, 44, 50, 51, 54, 55). It seems to us
that it was not a question of lack of notice on the part
of Appellants but rather of f.aulty advice.
CONCLUSION
Since the proofs of the foregoing brief were received
from the printer, the Utah case of Knight v. Flat Top
.\Iining Co., filed .January 8, 1957, No. 8439, has come
to the attention of Respondents. That case held that the
unpatented mining clain1s acquired by relocation of
prior clai1ns, when the latter were subject to relocation
for failure to do assessn1ent work, by a co-owner, to the
exclusion of the other owners, is subject to a trust in
favor of the excluded owners and their successors in
interest. The Court quoted, with approval, the general
rule from Stevens v. Grand Cen,tral Mining Co., supra,
cited on page 4 of this brief, which is applicable to the
facts of this case.
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence of
record is sufficient to sustain the finding of the trial
court that the defendant John J. Knop held the title
acquired by his relocation of the Faith claims on August
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lants, having notice of the s.ame, took the claims subject
to the interest of the plaintiffs.
Accordingly, it is submitted that the judgment of
the lower court should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

ADA:NIS, PETERSON & ANDERSON
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Respondents
::Monticello, Utah
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